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ABSTRACT 
 
A method of improving the security of biometric templates 
which satisfies desirable properties such as (a) irreversibility 
of the template, (b) revocability and assignment of a new 
template to the same biometric input, (c) matching in the 
secure transformed domain is presented. It makes use of an 
iterative procedure based on the bispectrum that serves as an 
irreversible transformation for biometric features because 
signal phase is discarded each iteration. Unlike the usual 
hash function, this transformation preserves closeness in the 
transformed domain for similar biometric inputs. A number 
of such templates can be generated from the same input. 
These properties are illustrated using synthetic data and 
applied to images from the FRGC 3D database with Gabor 
features. Verification can be successfully performed using 
these secure templates with an EER of 5.85% 
 
Index Terms— Face recognition, Higher order statistics 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Biometric template data must be protected to prevent 
information leakage in case of template compromise. 
Biometric data is inherently linked to an individual and can 
reveal private information about that individual such as 
their genealogy, personality and state of health [1]. The 
biometric itself (as opposed to a template) is permanent and 
therefore an individual can be cross-matched or tracked 
between two separate systems that use the same biometric 
modality. Furthermore, the feature extraction process of 
many biometric systems is invertible and template data can 
be used by an attacker to reverse engineer an artifact that can 
be used to spoof the system. For example knowledge of a 
trained PCA eigenspace coupled with the PCA eigenvalues 
for an individual allows reconstruction of the individual’s 
face [2]. Fingerprint minutia information can also be reverse 
engineered from templates and used to create artificial 
fingerprints [3]. Template data is thus insecure and should 
be kept secret. 
These issues raise a number of ethical, social and 
security problems that have hindered the uptake of 
biometrics and must be overcome if biometrics are to gain 
widespread acceptance. Template security techniques were 
first introduced in [4] and since then numerous other 
techniques have been proposed. Comprehensive reviews of 
the area are given in [5] and [6]. Existing techniques often 
fail to satisfy all three requirements: privacy, cancelability 
and security. 
 
Figure 1. The enrolment and verification phases of a traditional 
biometric system. A person’s biometric features (F) are extracted 
and stored during enrolment. Verification compares newly 
extracted features (F’) with the stored template F. 
 
Figure 2. The enrolment and verification phase of the proposed 
secure biometric system. The persons biometric feature (F) is 
passed through a hash like function to produce a transformed copy 
T(F). Verification is done by comparing in the transformed (T) 
domain. 
 
This paper proposes the use of a Higher Order Spectral 
(HOS) Transform that can be applied to biometric data as a 
secure hash function. This HOS transform is non-invertible, 
is robust to noise in the input allowing it to tolerate the 
natural variations present in a biometric and can be made to 
produce a large number of significantly different outputs 
given an identical input. A description of the HOS 
transformation is presented in section 2, followed by a 
demonstration of its desirable properties using synthetic data 
in section 3. We than apply the HOS transform to biometric 
features extracted from 3D facial images in the FRGC 
database in section 4 with a discussion and analysis of the 
results in section 5. 
 
2. THE HIGHER ORDER SPECTRAL TRANSFORM 
 
Most real world signals are not Gaussian in nature and 
cannot be fully described using only first and second-order 
moments (the mean and covariance). It is for this reason that 
Higher Order Spectra, which utilize higher than second-
order statistics has been proposed for many signal 
processing applications [7]. Although originally defined for 
stationary and ergodic random signals, they have been 
extended to deterministic signals as well.  
Of these higher than second-order statistics the third-
order (the bispectrum) has proven to be the most popular 
due to its ease of computation. The bispectrum is the Fourier 
transform of the third-order moment and for a real valued 
deterministic signal ( )x n is given by: 
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The HOS transform described in this paper is based on the 
HOS feature extraction process introduced by Chandran and 
Elgar in [8, 9] which display a number of useful properties 
that make it a suitable template security scheme that satisfies 
all three requirements mentioned in the introduction. 
 
1. The robustness to additive noise allows the HOS 
transform to tolerate small variations of the same 
biometric. 
2. The bispectrum is complex-valued and discarding the 
phase information at each iteration allows for 
irreversibility. 
3. The set of invariant HOS features described in [8] is 
sensitive to permutations while retaining robustness to 
small changes in amplitude or time scaling. This 
facilitates the design of a robust hash function. 
 
The HOS transform is applied by taking the N-point discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT) of an amplitude and mean 
normalized version of the input signal ( )x n to obtain ( )X f . 
Only the magnitude of ( )X f is retained, discarding the 
phase information prevents the inverse Fourier transform 
from being applied to obtain the original signal ( )x n . This 
magnitude spectrum is the zero padded to length N and from 
this an estimate of the bispectrum can be extracted by 
Fourier transforming as in equation 1. The phase component 
of the bispectrum estimation 1 2( , )B f f is retained that making 
it complex valued and sensitive to asymmetry. 
Once the bispectrum is estimated HOS features can be 
extracted using the process proposed in [9]. The bispectrum 
is integrated along radial slices in the bifrequency plane to 
obtain: 
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Frequencies used in the above equation are first normalized 
by the Nyquist frequency and the zero frequency term (the 
average signal) is ignored. The variable a represents the 
slope of the line along which the integral of the bispectrum 
is computed. 
The integrated bispectrum is then fed back as a complex 
valued input for the next iteration. The mean and amplitude 
normalization performed at the sat of each iteration ensures 
the output remains stable. After each iteration (i) a measure 
of change is taken between the current output and that of the 
previous iteration. This is in the form of a complex dot 
product (D) of the difference between the current ( ( )iV a ) 
and previous (
1( )iV a ) output with the previous output. 
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The dot product between two complex vectors can be 
represented as a magnitude (
iM ) and angle ( i ) pair. The 
HOS transform will produce i such pairs, one for each 
iteration and can be visualized by plotting as a trajectory in 
polar coordinate space. The magnitude and angle pairs can 
be concatenated together to form the HOS transformed 
feature (H). 
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Representing the output this way has a number of 
advantages. Firstly, the length of the output (H) is dependent 
solely on the number of iterations and not on the length of 
the original input. Secondly, H remains generic in 
appearance regardless of the nature of the input. The use for 
the dot product in producing D can be viewed as a second 
tier of information loss, this is because the integrated 
bispectra re not stored and cannot be calculated from M 
and . 
 
3. THE PROPERTIES OF THE HOS TRANSFORM 
 
In order to demonstrate the properties of the HOS transform 
that allow it to serve as a template security facilitator we 
show both the Gaussian noise immunity and the 
cancelability of the HOS features on a small test data set 
using artificial generated signals. A simple verification 
system based on the Mahalanobis distance classifier is used 
to distinguish between the three signals after the HOS 
transformation process. This verification system is trained 
using 15 slightly noisy (31dB SNR) versions of each of the 
original signals. The HOS transform is applied to each for 
25 iterations and the expected value and standard deviations 
of the output feature vector are retained as training 
(template) data. 
 
3.1 Gaussian Noise Immunity 
 
Robustness of the output to input noise is an indication of 
how well the HOS transform will tolerate variations in the 
input feature vector that results from changes due to lighting 
and expression. Even the most invariant biometric 
modalities can display significant intra-class variation. This 
will negatively impact verification performance in the HOS 
transformed feature space if no noise immunity is present. 
 
Figure 3. Trajectories of an identical input with different amounts 
of Gaussian noise. No noise, 30dB, 20dB. 
 
By analyzing the HOS output trajectories of a noise free 
signal compared to the trajectories of those with different 
amounts of additive Gaussian noise it can be clearly seen 
that low levels do significantly affect the HOS output 
(Figure 3). It is only when the SNR degrades to 20dB before 
significant deviations in trajectory can be observed. 
 
Figure 4. EER performance at different input noise levels. 
 
These results are further demonstrated by attempting to 
classify using noisy inputs ranging from 30dB SNR to 0dB 
SNR. The EER obtained at each level is presented in Figure 
4. 
 
3.2 Cancelability 
 
In order for a template security system to be cancelable it 
must be capable of producing different outputs given an 
identical input. The HOS transform, although robust to 
Gaussian noise, is still sensitive to permutations of the input. 
By applying different permutations different outputs can be 
obtained and since the process is one-way it is not possible 
for the original input to be recovered even if the permutation 
applied is known. It is this sensitivity combined with non-
invertibility that allows cancelable templates to be produced. 
 
Figure 5. Original signal (left) compared against differently 
permuted versions of itself. 
 
Given an input vector of length N there exists 2
N
 possible 
permutations. Even a small N of 10 gives 1024 possible 
combinations, more than enough template reissues for a life 
time in most applications. Figure 5 shows an original signal 
compared with 2 different permuted versions of it and shows 
the significant differences in trajectory caused by using a 
different permutation. This is further analyzed by producing 
50 permuted versions of each signal and attempting to verify 
in the transformed domain. Figure 6 indicates that even at 
high SNR (low noise) only a poor EER of around 50% can 
be achieved. This will ensure that the new template will not 
be correlated to earlier ones. 
 
Figure 6. EER performance under different permutations and 
varying noise levels. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We apply the methodology to face recognition using the 
FRGC 3D database. The feature extraction is based on 
Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) where Gabor jets 
are obtained at key fiducial points on the face. PCA is then 
applied to the Gabor jet features to remove redundancy and 
reduce dimensionality followed by LDA to maximize 
separation between classes. This is the baseline system 
whose output is then HOS transformed to produce secure 
templates. 
The FRGC 3D database contains images for 298 
individuals with between 4 and 30 images per person. In 
order to provide sufficient training and testing images per 
individual the 90 individuals who had less than 10 images 
were not included in the tests. Eight images from each of the 
remaining 208 individuals were used to train the system and 
the remainder (at least 2 per person) was used for testing. 
 
Figure 7. Sample images from the FRGC 3D database showing 
locations of the 17 fiducial points 
 
The training images are manually landmarked to locate 17 
fiducial points around the eyes and nose. At each point a 
bank of 40 Gabor filters (5 frequencies at 8 rotations) are 
applied. The Gabor features from the training data is used to 
create the PCA (300 dimensions) and LDA (40 dimensions) 
spaces. When tested over the test data this baseline system 
can perform recognition at an EER of less than 0.01% 
(Figure 8). 
This LDA feature vector is passed through the HOS 
transform to produce secure templates. These features are 
first zero padded to length 254 to improve spectral 
resolution in the frequency domain and HOS transformed for 
25 iterations producing a length 50 output feature vector 
(H). A further step of PCA+LDA can be applied to improve 
discrimination of these transformed features. Experiments 
showed that the optimal number of eigenvectors retained is 
40 for PCA and 10 for LDA achieving the best EER of 
5.85% (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. DET curves for baseline system and HOS transformed 
with PCA+LDA. 
 
The overall system would require the storage of a number of 
parameters in the template, the PCA and LDA spaces first 
applied to the Gabor jet features, the permutation used prior 
to HOS transformation, the PCA and LDA spaces applied to 
H (output of the HOS transform) and the output of the final 
LDA step which is the final feature vector used for 
classification. From an attacker’s perspective the loss of a 
user’s template would allow reconstruction of H (using the 
final feature vector and the PCA/LDA spaces) since both 
PCA and LDA are invertible processes. However H cannot 
be inverted, preventing the attacker from gaining the original 
biometric input. 
The process is also computationally feasible taking 
approximately 1.6 seconds on a Pentium Core 2 Duo 2.0 
GHZ CPU to compute 25 iterations of the HOS transform 
for an input zero padded to length 256. 
The added benefits of the HOS transform do come at a 
cost to verification performance. The use of a non-linear and 
unpredictable transformation makes it hard to prevent or 
limit this loss of discriminating information. However two 
keys points must be kept in mind. Firstly, although the 
baseline system has a good EER of near 0% it remains 
vulnerable to a number of attacks that rely on exploiting 
unprotected template data, the performance of such systems 
can degrade significantly when these attacks are carried out 
against them. Secondly, tests with synthetic data show that 
the amount of separability in the HOS transformed domain is 
directly related to the degree of separability in the input 
feature domain. If separation of classes can be improved and 
their intra-class variance minimized then performance in the 
HOS transformed domain would also improve. This could 
be achieved with improvements in feature extraction, multi-
modal biometrics or new modalities such as DNA which is 
highly invariant and would benefit greatly from the added 
security benefits of the HOS transform 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
A new technique is proposed for producing secure biometric 
templates that guarantees security, privacy and cancelability. 
It uses a well known higher order signal processing 
technique in a novel application as a robust hash function 
that allows biometric template matching while preventing 
reconstruction of the biometric through inversion of 
template data. 
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